Foreign Extradition and In Absentia Convictions
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I.

INTRODUCTION

International requests for the extradition of a fugitive are triggered either by a pending charge or by a conviction.' When extradition is sought on the basis of the latter, the proof necessary to support the request ordinarily will consist of a certified copy of the
conviction. 2
If the conviction was obtained in absentia, however,
courts often will treat the request as if it involved a charge and require sufficient, independent evidence to justify a reasonable belief
that the fugitive committed the crime.3
This Article, which is divided into three parts, examines the developing case law on foreign requests for extradition when the basis
for the request is a conviction obtained in absentia. First, and by way
of background, this Article provides an overview of foreign requests
for extradition. Next, this Article discusses the mechanics of the

* Senior Trial Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Office of International Affairs;J.D., 1983, Catholic University Law School. The views expressed herein
are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department ofJustice or the United States.
See, e.g., Treaty of Extradition, U.S.-Braz., art. I, Jan. 13, 1961, 15 U.S.T. 2093
(stating that each Contracting State agrees to surrender persons found within "its
territory who have been charged with or convicted of crimes or offenses specified in
Article II of the present Treaty"). The term "charge" in the context of extradition
treaties "has been interpreted by courts to require something less than a formal
charge: for example, the requirement has been deemed satisfied where a subject is
,accused' . . . or the requesting nation intend[s] to prosecute him." Sacirbey v. Guccione, No. 05 CV 2949, 2006 WL 2585561, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2006) (citations
omitted).
2 See, e.g., Spatola v. United States, 925 F.2d 615, 618
(2d Cir. 1991) ("[A] certified copy of a foreign conviction, obtained following a trial at which the defendant
was present, is sufficient to sustain a judicial officer's determination that probable
cause exists to extradite.").
3 See, e.g., Germany v. United States, No. 06 CV 01201, 2007 WL 2581894, at *7
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2007) ("Where a defendant was convicted in absentia, the conviction is merely a charge and an independent determination of probable cause in order to extradite must be made.").
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extradition hearing. Lastly, this Article analyzes the developing case
law on extradition requests based on in absentia convictions.
II.

OVERVIEW OF EXTRADITION

Extradition involves "the surrender by one nation to another of
an individual accused or convicted of an offence outside of its own
territory, and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which,
being competent to try and punish him, demands the surrender."4
Foreign requests for extradition are governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3184'
and, with limited exception, by treaty.' The process is triggered when
the Department of State receives a formal request from a foreign
country.7 In some instances, the foreign country initially will seek the
provisional arrest of the fugitive." In other cases, a complete extradiTerlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES ch. 7B, introductory cmt., at 556-57
(1987) ("Extradition is the process by which a person charged with or convicted of a
crime under the law of one state is arrested in another state and returned for trial
and punishment.").
Section 3184 provides, in relevant part:
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the
4

United States and any foreign government .... any justice or judge of

the United States, or any magistrate judge authorized to do so by a
court of the United States, or any judge of a court of record of general
jurisdiction of any State may... issue [a] warrant for the apprehension
of the person. . . charged [with having committed within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the crimes provided for by
treaty or convention], that he may be brought before such justice,
judge, or magistrate judge, to the end that the evidence of criminality
may be heard and considered.
18 U.S.C. § 3184 (2006). See United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 109 (1st Cir.
1997) ("In the United States, the procedures for extradition are governed by statute.").

6 See In re Extradition of Mironescu, 296 F. Supp. 2d 632,
634 (M.D.N.C. 2003)
("It is only because the United States has an extradition treaty with Romania that the
United States has authority and duty to extradite: current United States extradition
statutes only authorize extradition in compliance with an extradition treaty."). Comity allows for the return of third-country nationals, i.e., persons who are not citizens,
nationals, or residents of the United States, absent a treaty, provided certain conditions are satisfied. 18 U.S.C. § 3181(b) (2000); see Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203,
208 (3d Cir. 1975) ("International extradition is governed only by considerations of
comity and treaty provisions.").
7 See Manta v. Chertoff, 518 F.3d 1134, 1140 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Extradition
from
the United States is a diplomatic process that is initiated when a foreign nation requests extradition of an individual from the State Department.") (quotation omitted).
8 See Duran v. United States, 36 F. Supp. 2d 622, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("In order
to avoid the flight of a defendant during preparation of a full formal request, many
extradition treaties permit a provisional arrest to be made upon receipt of an informal request.").
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tion request will be submitted. After the Department of State reviews
the request to ensure that it conforms to the treaty, it will prepare a
declaration authenticating the request and send it to the Department
of Justice's Office of International Affairs, which will in turn review
the request and send it to the United States Attorney for the district
where the person sought to be extradited is located.9 The United
States Attorney then files a complaint in support of an arrest warrant
for the fugitive in federal district court."0
After the fugitive is apprehended, in the case of a provisional arrest, the foreign government provides, within a prescribed time period, the additional information required under the treaty to carry
out the extradition request to the U.S. government." An extradition
hearing then follows at which, if the judicial officer "deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge"' -meaning a finding of probable cause"-he will certify the same to the Secretary of State, who
will review the case and determine whether to issue a surrender warrant for the fugitive. 4 Absent "sufficient cause," a fugitive who is not
See U.S. ATrORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-15.700 (1997), available at http://www.usdoj.
gov/usao/eousa/foiajreading_room/usam/title9/15mcrm.htm (explaining how the
Department of Justice, Office of International Affairs will review request for sufficiency and then forward it to appropriate district).
10 See 18 U.S.C. § 3184; Wang v. Masaitis, 316 F. Supp. 2d 891, 896
(C.D. Cal.
2004) ("Once approved, the United States Attorney for the judicial district where the
person sought is located files a complaint in federal district court seeking an arrest
warrant for the person sought.") (quotation omitted).
11 SeeJeffrey M. Olson, Note, Gaugingan Adequate ProbableCause Standardfor
Provisional Arrest in Light of Parretti v. United States, 48 CATH. U. L. REv. 161, 172 (1998)
("After executing the provisional arrest request, the requesting state furnishes the
United States with any additional information that is required for extradition under
the governing statute and treaty.").
, 18 U.S.C. § 3184.
13 See In re Extradition Drayer, 190 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir. 1999) ("An extradition
proceeding is not a forum in which to establish[] the guilt or innocence of the accused; rather, the sole inquiry is into probable cause."); In re Extradition of Atuar,
300 F. Supp. 2d 418, 426 (S.D. W. Va. 2003) ("Evidence sufficient to sustain the
charge is determined on the basis of probable cause in extradition proceedings.")
(quotation omitted).
14 See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (providing that judicial officer "shall certify
the same ...
to the Secretary of State, that a warrant may issue ... for the surrender of such person"); id. § 3186 ("The Secretary of State may order the person committed under
section[] 3184 ...to be delivered to any authorized agent of such foreign government."); see also Choe v. Torres, 525 F.3d 733, 736 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008) ("The ultimate
decision whether to extradite is left to the Secretary of State."). The prevailing view
is that the Secretary of State will seldom reject an extradition request after a judicial
finding of extraditability. See, e.g.,John T. Parry, The Lost History of InternationalExtradition Litigation, 43 VA.J. INT'L L. 93, 96 (2002) ("In practice ....the Secretary rarely
exercises discretion, perhaps because the needs of diplomacy outweigh the concerns
of individuals who may have committed crimes.").
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surrendered to the requesting country within two months of the
commitment order must be released.1 5 Although there is no direct
appeal from a district court judge's or magistrate's extradition ruling,16 a limited review of that decision is available through a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 7
III. THE EXTRADITION HEARING
While extradition proceedings are not considered criminal
prosecutions,' they are akin to a preliminary hearing in a criminal
case.'5 In this respect, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
do not apply. 20 Any discovery afforded by the court is discretionary
15
16

See 18 U.S.C. § 3188 (2000).
See Hoxha v. Levi, 465 F.3d 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2006) ("An individual challenging

a court's extradition order may not appeal directly, because the order does not constitute a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, but may petition for a writ of habeas
corpus."); Valenzuela v. United States, 286 F.3d 1223, 1228 n.11 (lth Cir. 2002)
("There is no direct appeal from extradition decisions.").
17 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006).
SeeAfanasjevv. Hurlburt, 418 F.3d 1159, 1163 (11th
Cir. 2005) ("A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a proper method to contest an.
extradition order because there is no direct appeal in extradition proceedings.");
Bobadilla v. Reno, 826 F. Supp. 1428, 1431 (S.D. Fla. 1993) ("As there are no appeal
rights under 18 U.S.C. § 3184, a habeas corpus petition may be used to contest a Magistrate's decision on foreign extradition."). In a habeas proceeding, a petitioner
may challenge "whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the offense charged
[wa]s within the treaty and, by a somewhat liberal extension, whether there was any
evidence warranting the finding that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty." Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925); accord Haxhiaj v.
Hackman, 528 F.3d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 2008); Manta v. Chertoff, 518 F.3d 1134, 1140
(9th Cir. 2008). A final order in a habeas proceeding is subject to review under 28
U.S.C. § 2253 by the United Sates Court of Appeals for the circuit where the district
court is located. See In re Requested Extradition of Artt, 158 F.3d 462, 468-69 (9th
Cir. 1998).
is See DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F. 3d 865, 868 (7th Cir. 1999) ("Extradition...
is not a criminal prosecution.") (quotation omitted); Austin v. Healey, 5 F.3d 598,
603 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[A]n extradition hearing is not a criminal prosecution: the order of extraditability expresses no judgment on [petitioner's] guilt or innocence.").
19 See Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 463 (1888)
(noting that an extradition
proceeding is "of the character of those preliminary examinations which take place
every day in this country before an examining or committing magistrate for the purpose of determining whether a case is made out which will justify the holding of the
accused"); In re Extradition of Lehming, 951 F. Supp. 505, 513-14 (D. Del. 1996)
("Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3184, extradition hearings are in the nature of a preliminary hearing where the magistrate judge need only determine if there is probable
cause which justifies the holding of the accused to answer for a charge.") (quotation
omitted).
20 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 54(b) (5) ("These rules are not applicable to extradition
and rendition of fugitives."); FED. R. EVID. 1101 (d) (3) ("The rules... do not apply..
• [to] [p]roceedings for extradition or rendition. . . ."); In re Requested Extradition
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and "narrow in scope."2 ' The putative extraditee has no right either
to present witnesses that contradict the government's proof,22 or to

cross-examine any government witnesses, at least as to matters relevant to his defense.23 The evidence at the extradition hearing may
consist of unsworn statements 24 and hearsay, 25 and credibility determinations are solely within the purview of the judicial officer.26 Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 3190 permits the demanding country to introduce properly authenticated evidence gathered within its borders,27
while "[a]libi evidence, facts contradicting the requesting country's

of Smyth, 61 F.3d 711, 720-21 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he rules of evidence and civil
procedure that govern federal court proceedings heard under the authority of Article III of the United States Constitution do not apply in extradition hearings that
are conducted under the authority of a treaty enacted pursuant to Article II.").
21 Koskotas v. Roche, 931 F.2d 169, 175 (1st Cir. 1991).
But see In re Extradition
of Singh, 123 F.R.D. 108, 113-16 (D.N.J. 1987) (holding that courts have no inherent
power to allow discovery in extradition proceedings).
See Mainero v. Gregg, 164 F.3d 1199, 1207 n.7 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Generally, evidence that explains away . . . probable cause is the only evidence admissible at an
extradition hearing, whereas evidence that merely controverts the existence of probable cause, or raises a defense, is not admissible.").
23 See Yin-Choy v. Robinson, 858 F.2d 1400, 1407 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding
defendant was not denied due process when court refused to allow him to cross examine
witness at extradition hearing); Messina v. United States, 728 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.
1984) ("As in the case of a grand jury proceeding, a defendant has no right to crossexamine witnesses or introduce evidence to rebut that of the prosecutor.").
24 See Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317 (1922)
("[U]nsworn statements of absent witnesses may be acted upon by the committing magistrate, although they could
not have been received by him under the law of the State on a preliminary examination.").
25 See Haxhiaj v. Hackman, 528 F.3d 282, 292 (4th Cir.
2008) ("[C]ourts have
consistently concluded that hearsay is an acceptable basis for a probable cause determination .... "); United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 120 (1st Cir. 1997)
("The evidence may consist... entirely of hearsay.").
26 See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 815 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The credibility
of
witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony is solely within the province
of the extraditing magistrate.").
27 Section 3190, captioned "Evidence on hearing,"
states:
Depositions, warrants or other papers or copies thereof offered in evidence upon the hearing of any extradition case shall be received and
admitted as evidence on such hearing for all the purposes of such hearing if they shall be properly and legally authenticated so as to entitle
them to be received for similar purposes by the tribunals of the foreign
country from which the accused party shall have escaped, and the certificate of the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the United
States resident in such foreign country shall be proof that the same, so
offered, are authenticated in the manner required.
18 U.S.C. § 3190 (2006).
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proof, and defenses such as insanity, may properly be excluded at the
extradition hearing.""8
The
governing standard at an extradition hearing is probable
20
cause, which has been defined as evidence that "supports a reasonable belief that a fugitive committed the charged offenses.""0 Thus,
the judicial officer "does not weigh conflicting evidence and make
factual determinations but, rather, determines only whether there is
competent evidence to support the belief that the accused has committed the charged offense.""1 A certificate of extradition ultimately
will issue if the judge or magistrate has jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the person sought to be extradited, the offense for which
extradition was sought was an extraditable offense under a treaty in
effect at the time of the request, and the government presents competent evidence sufficient to establish probable cause that the extraditee committed the alleged offense. 2
IV. IN ABSENTIA CONVICTIONS

It is well settled that a "foreign conviction obtained after a trial at
which the accused is present is sufficient to support a finding of

28

United States v. Wiebe, 733 F.2d 549, 553 n.4 (8th Cir. 1984); see Hooker v.

Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1368 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding alibi or other evidence contradicting proof of probable cause inadmissible); United States v. Peterka, 307 F. Supp.
2d 1344, 1349 (M.D. Fla. 2003) ("[E]xtraditees may only introduce evidence to explain rather than contradict the evidence presented by the Government, and the
court shall exclude evidence that is proffered to contradict testimony, challenge the
credibility of witnesses, or establish a defense to the crimes alleged."). See Jacques
Semmelman, The Rule of Non-Contradiction in InternationalExtradition Proceedings: A
Proposed Approach to the Admission of Exculpatory Evidence, 23 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 1295
(2000).
See Hoxha v. Levi, 465 F.3d 554, 561 (3d Cir. 2006) ("The probable cause standard applicable to an extradition hearing is the same as the standard used in federal
preliminary hearings."); Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 562 (5th Cir. 1962)
("With respect to the evidence upon which the extradition magistrate acted, it must
be remembered that the extradition magistrate merely determines probable cause,
making an inquiry like that of a committing magistrate and no more.").
30 Peterka, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 1349; accord In re Extradition of Chan Seong-I,
346 F.
Supp. 2d 1149, 1161 (D.N.M. 2004) ("The evidence showing probable cause need
not be sufficient to support a conviction, but need only be sufficient to warrant a
finding that there are reasonable grounds to believe the relator is guilty and thus
hold her for trial.").
31 In re Extradition of Solis, 402 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (quoting
Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 815 (9th Cir. 1986)).
32 See, e.g., Cheung v. United States, 213 F.3d 82, 87-88 (2d
Cir. 2000) (identifying factors to establish probable cause); Enami v. U.S. Dist. Court, 834 F.2d 1444,
1447 (9th Cir. 1987) (same).
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probable cause for the purpose of extradition." 3 Two justifications
have been advanced in support of this view. The first, based on a
common-sense application of the probable cause standard, is "that a
reasonable person would have reasonable cause to believe that a person is guilty of a crime if that person has been convicted of that
crime." 4 The second justification concerns the need to abide by
principles of international comity. '
But what if the fugitive was not present at all, voluntarily excused
himself after some participation in his trial, or was represented only
by counsel? How is the standard then applied? And what role, if any,
do the courts play when a defendant convicted in absentia contests
his extradition on the grounds that his surrender to the requesting
state violates his right to due process because he will not be afforded
a new trial? The cases discussed below address these questions.
A.

No DistinctionBetween Nature of Conviction

A number of courts have held that an in absentia conviction
provides sufficient evidence of criminality on its face to satisfy the
probable cause requirement governing extradition requests. For example, in Gouveia v. Vokes,3 6 Portugal sought the defendant's extradition on the basis of an in absentia conviction under which he was senThe
tenced to three years and nine months' imprisonment. 3
33 Sidali v. INS, 107 F.3d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Spatola,
925
F.2d 615, 618 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[A] certified copy of a foreign conviction, obtained
following a trial at which the defendant was present, is sufficient to sustain a judicial
officer's determination that probable cause exists to extradite."); United States v.
Clark, 470 F. Supp. 976, 978 (D. Vt. 1979) ("[T]he certified copy of respondent's
Certificate of Conviction in Canada... is sufficient proof that probable cause exists
that respondent has been guilty of an offense involving criminality and we hold that
document satisfies the requirement that the court find sufficient 'evidence of criminality' as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3184."); In re Extradition of Edmondson, 352 F.
Supp. 22, 24 (D. Minn. 1972) ("The court finds the certified copies of convictions in
Canada to be sufficient proof that probable cause exists that respondents there have
been guilty of an offense involving 'criminality' and finds these documents to satisfy
the requirement that the court hear the 'evidence of criminality' as set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3184.").
Lindstrom v. Gilkey, No. 98 C 5191, 1999 WL 342320, at *10 (N.D. Ill. May 24,
1999).
35
See Haxhiaj v. Hackman, 528 F.3d 282, 290 (4th Cir. 2008) ("The principle that
foreign convictions generally constitute probable cause under § 3184 is rooted in
comity."); Spatola, 925 F.2d at 618 ("To hold that such convictions do not constitute
probable cause in the United States would require United States judicial officers to
review trial records and, consequently, substitute their judgment for that of foreign
jud es and juries.").
800 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
37 Id. at 242.
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magistrate judge found the defendant extraditable, and the defendant thereafter sought review of that decision by filing a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. 38 While the district court ultimately granted
the relief sought on the grounds that a statutory amendment authorizing the extradition of American citizens under the treaty was not
applicable to the defendant (because he had been convicted prior to
the amendment), it recognized that, given the limited scope of review
of a magistrate's decision and the "modest requirements" of § 3184, 39
it could not "question whether, in fact, 40the Portuguese Court was correct in finding [the defendant] guilty."

Similarly, in United States v. Bogue,4' France sought the defendant's extradition on the basis of an in absentia conviction.
After
the magistrate judge issued a certificate of extraditability, the defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging, in part, that
the magistrate's determination of probable cause was erroneous because it was based solely on an in absentia conviction.
Relying on
Gouveia, the district court ruled that such a conviction was legally sufficient to satisfy the probable cause requirement. 4 The district court
found that "the French government's procedural fairness in undertaking the [defendant's] trial in his absence" was beyond the scope of
review in determining the reasonableness of the magistrate's ruling.45
Courts outside of the Third Circuit also have recognized that an
in absentia conviction conclusively establishes probable cause for
purposes of extradition. In support of their rulings, these courts have
relied on Esposito v. INS, 46 where, in the context of deportation, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a
certified copy of an in absentia conviction was sufficient to establish
"probable cause to believe that the [defendant was] guilty of the
crimes in question." 47

Thus, in United States v. Avdic, 4 the district

38

Id.

39

See supranote 5.
Gouveia, 800 F. Supp. at 245. The court observed that although the defenses

40

raised by Gouveia to his in absentia conviction "might well create 'reasonable doubt'
in the minds of an American jury, [the court] simply [could not] impugn the regularity of the 1987 proceedings in Lisbon." Id. at 245 n.5.
No. CRIM.A. 98-572-M, 1998 WL 966070 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 1998).
42 Id. at
*1.
43 Id. at *2.
4

Id.

45 Id.
46

47

936 F.2d 911 (7th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 914. In Esposito, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or "the Board")

declined to grant the defendant a waiver of exclusion-his spouse was a United
States citizen-in part because of three in absentia convictions. Id. at 913-14. In de-

HeinOnline -- 39 Seton Hall L. Rev. 850 2009

2009]

FOREIGNEXTRADITION

court held that an in absentia conviction from a tribunal in Bosnia
and Herzegovina was sufficient on its face to establish probable cause
for the defendant's extradition.49
In Haxhiaj v. Hackman,50 where the government relied on a conviction in absentia that was affirmed by the Court of Appeal of Milan
and a statement from an Italian magistrate, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit declined to "weigh in on the question of whether the fact of a foreign conviction, without more, can
ever be sufficient to establish probable cause under § 3184 when the
conviction resulted from a trial conducted in absentia." 5' However,
the court of appeals went on to note that it "seem[ed] debatable that
the international comity justification for the general rule that foreign
convictions constitute probable cause5 2 under § 3184 would not include in absentia foreign convictions."
B.

Presence at ProceedingLeading to Conviction

When a fugitive partially participates in his trial but voluntarily
chooses not to return before a final judgment in the case is rendered,
courts have treated any ensuing conviction as sufficient for establishing probable cause for extradition. In United States ex rel. Bloomfield v.
Genger,53 for example, the defendants were charged by Canadian authorities with conspiracy to import, conspiracy to export, and conspiracy to traffic in hashish.5 4 After the evidence was presented, the
judge dismissed the case, finding that there had been a variance betermining whether the BIA had abused its discretion in considering these convictions
under its "waiver calculus," the court expressed no view as to whether the Board was
correct in its analysis that an in absentia conviction established conclusive proof of
guilt, but agreed with the BIA's fall back position that such a conviction was probative of "something less than guilt." Id. at 914. In the words of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, while "in absentia convictions ought not to
be treated as evidence of guilt, they may certainly stand for something less: at the
very least, in absentia convictions properly constitute probable cause to believe that
the petitioner is guilty of the crimes in question." Id. at 914. The court went on to
note that such convictions were not "solely by virtue of their in absentia nature, so
fundamentally infirm as to preclude the Board from considering them for this limited purpose." Id.
48 No. CR. 07-M06, 2007 WL 1875778 (D.S.D.
June 28, 2007).
49 Id. at *8. In Avdic, the defendant conceded "that on its face
the Bosnian
judgment provide[d] probable cause." Id. at *2. He argued that the conviction
which authorities obtained was deficient because it was based on a coerced confession from him. Id.
50 528 F.3d 282 (4th Cir.
2008).
51 Id. at 291.
52 Id. at 291 n.2.
53 507 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1974).
54 Id. at 926.
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5 5 The defentween the charges and the evidence adduced at trial.
6
States.1
United
dants thereafter returned home to the
In conformity with Canadian law, the Crown appealed the dismissal of the case and the appellate court reversed the ruling below,
entering a judgment of conviction against the defendants for conspiracy to import hashish.
The defendants were subsequently arrested in the United States and extradition proceedings were initiated against them. 58 After a finding by the magistrate that there
were no valid grounds to refuse the extradition request, the defendants filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging that ruling.5 9 The district court denied the petition, and the defendants thereafter appealed that denial to the circuit court. 6°
In rejecting the defendants' argument that the ruling below was
infirm because it was based on convictions obtained in absentia, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found the defendants' characterization of their convictions "technical" and held
that, in fact, they were "not tried in absentia. 6 ' The court pointed
out that the defendants had been present at the trial and had been
represented by counsel.6 Indeed, their counsel was able to suppress63
their confessions and also succeeded in dismissing the indictment.
That the defendants "left Canada voluntarily after the original dismissal of the charges," rather than awaiting the final conclusion of the
criminal proceeding against them did not, the court concluded,
render their convictions in absentia.64
A similar result was reached by the court in Lindstrom v. Gilkey.6 '
In Lindstrom, the defendant was indicted on Norwegian fraud charges
resulting from his participation in a pyramid scheme in which hundreds of investors were fraudulently induced to invest over fifteen
million dollars.66
The defendant was represented by counsel

Id. The court found that a single conspiracy was proved, whereas the indictment charged three separate conspiracies. Id.
55

56

Id.

57 Id.
5 Id

5" United States ex rel.
Bloomfield v. Gengler, 507 F.2d 925, 927 (2d Cir. 1974).
60 Id.
62

Id. at 928-29.
Id. at 929.

63

Id.

61

Id. The court also ruled that defendants' contention that the evidence against
them was insufficient was "frivolous" given the limited scope of review. Id.
64

No. 98 C 5191, 1999 WL 342320 (N.D. Ill. May 14,1999).
Id. at *1,3.
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throughout the trial.6 ' Towards the end of the trial, after evidence on
his behalf had been presented, the defendant asked for and was
granted permission to be absent for several days.' When he did not
return, the judge continued with the69 trial and ultimately convicted
him of the charges in the indictment.
Following the defendant's conviction, Norway sought his extradition from the United States. 70 After a magistrate concluded that he
was extraditable, the defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, alleging in part that the magistrate had erred by failing to
make a probable cause determination independent of the certified
conviction upon which Norway relied.71 In denying the petition, the
district court observed that while the defendant's conviction had
been rendered in absentia, it was not at all apparent that the law involving in absentia convictions in the context of extradition requests
applied to someone like the defendant who "attended the vast majority of his case and left his trial (and the country) without permission
from the trial court., 7' Furthermore, there was no indication that the
verdict rested "to any significant degree" on evidence presented after
the defendant elected not to return to the trial. 7 Finally, the district
court also found that under Esposito, an in absentia conviction was
sufficient in and of itself to establish probable cause for purposes of
extradition.74
C. Representation by Counsel Alone
There is some support in case law for the proposition that representation by counsel alone renders any ensuing conviction as one returned in absentia, thereby not affording such conviction conclusive
effect for purposes of establishing probable cause. In Gallina v. Fraser,7 5 Italy sought the defendant's extradition on the basis of two robbery convictions obtained in absentia. 76 In one of the trials, the defendant was represented by counsel. 77 The district court denied the
defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus concluding that, in67

Id. at *1.

68 Id.
69

Id.

70

Id. at *2.

71

Lindstrom, 1999 WL 342320, at *9-10.

72

Id. at *10.

73

Id.

74 Id.

75

177 F. Supp. 856 (D. Conn. 1959).

76

Id. at 862.

77

Id.
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dependent of the conviction, "there [was] sufficient evidence of criminality tojustify extradition."78
The holding of the district court subsequently was affirmed by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit which,
when discussing the imposition of conditions affecting the surrender
of a fugitive, reiterated the rule "that a foreign conviction in absentia
does not preclude the federal court from considering whether sufficient evidence of the [defendant's] criminality has been presented in
the extradition proceeding. 7 9 Following this ruling, at least one
court has interpreted Gallina to stand for the proposition that the
presence of counsel alone at a foreign trial is insufficient to give an in
absentia conviction conclusive effect insofar as the probable cause determination at the extradition hearing is concerned.""
Scenarios may well arise, however, where representation by
counsel and other factors may lead a court to conclude that while an
ensuing conviction was not returned with the fugitive's presence, his
actions and participation through counsel give the conviction conclusive effect for purposes of probable cause. For example, if the record
reveals that the fugitive fled because he knew he was about to be
charged, and that he then actively participated through counsel in his
ensuing trial and any appeal that followed from the resulting conviction, a court may conclude that such a conviction, without more, establishes probable cause under § 3184.
D. No Participationin ProceedingLeading to Conviction
When the foreign conviction in support of the request for the
fugitive's extradition was obtained without his presence, many courts
treat the conviction merely as a charge, requiring an independent
finding of probable cause."' In some cases, when the government has
78

Id. at 866.

79 Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1960).
80

See In re Extradition of Ernst, No. 97 CRIM.MISC.1 PG.22, 1998 WL 395267, at

*7-8 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1998). See also United States v. Fernandez-Morris, 99 F. Supp.
2d 1358, 1365 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (acknowledging that a public defender was appointed
to represent the defendants but then recognizing that "[b]ecause Defendants were
convicted in absentia, that conviction is only considered a charge for purposes of the
Court's probable cause analysis.").
s, See Argento v. Horn, 241 F.2d 258, 264 n.1 (6th Cir. 1957); Germany v. United
States, No. 06 CV 01201, 2007 WL 2581894, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2007); In re
Extradition of Haxhiaj, No. 1:05mj829, 2006 WL 2381966, at *1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 16,
2006); Arambasic v. Ashcroft, 403 F. Supp. 2d 951, 962 (D.S.D. 2005); In re Extradition of Harrison, No. 03 CR. MISC. 01, 2004 WL 1145831, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. May 21,
2004); In re Extradition of Ribaudo, No. 00 CRIM.MISC.1PG.(KN, 2004 WL 213021,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2004); Fernandez-Morris,99 F. Supp. 2d at 1365; In re Extradition
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relied on little more than the judgment of conviction in support of its
extradition request, courts have declined to find probable cause. In
others, the judgment of conviction appears to have provided sufficient information for the courts to make an independent determination. In yet other cases, the government provided additional record
evidence that the courts have relied upon to arrive at their rulings.
The following cases illustrate this point.
In In re Extradition of Ribaudo,82 Italy sought the defendant's
extradition on the basis of an in absentia conviction for conspiracy
and drug trafficking under which the defendant was sentenced to
eleven years imprisonment. The only evidence provided in support
of the defendant's extradition was the decision of the Florence Court
of Appeal, which referenced records of taped conversations involving
the defendant and others, and two incriminating letters. 84 The district court found that because the underlying record evidence had
not been provided, it could not "make an independent determination concerning whether there [was] probable cause to believe that
[the defendant] committed the crimes charged." 5 Additionally, the
court found that the "description of the underlying evidence" in the
decision from the Florence Court of Appeal itself did not support a
reasonable belief that the defendant was guilty of the charged
86
crimes.
A similar result was reached by the court in In re Extradition of
Ernst,87 where, in support of Switzerland's extradition request, the only evidence submitted by the government was the decision rendered
by the Zurich Supreme Court reflecting the defendant's in absentia
conviction with a few attachments.8
While acknowledging that
"[p]robable cause is not an overly demanding standard," the district
court found that the "facts" in the Zurich Supreme Court's opinion
of Ernst, 1998 WL 395267, at *7; In re Extradition of Mylonas, 187 F. Supp. 716, 721
(N.D. Ala. 1960); United States ex rel. Argento v.Jacobs, 176 F. Supp. 877, 879 (N.D.
Ohio 1959); In re Extradition of D'Amico, 177 F. Supp. 648, 651 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1959);
Ex parteLa Mantia, 206 F. 330, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1913); Ex parte Fudera, 162 F. 591, 592
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908); see also In re Extradition of Yarden, No. 87-1250-M, 1989 WL
56119, at *7-8 (E.D.N.Y. May 24, 1989). Other than Fernandez-Morris,these opinions

do not mention whether the defendant was represented by counsel in the foreign
proceeding resulting in the conviction.
82 Ribaudo, 2004 WL
213021.
83

84
85

86
87
88

Id. at*1-3.
Id. at *6.

Id.
Id. at *6-7.
No. 97 CRIM.MISC.1 PG.22, 1998 WL 395267, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1998).
Id. at *10.
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represented "conclusions" drawn from exhibits which had not been
furnished, leaving the court without an evidentiary basis from which
to make an independent determination of probable cause.m
In some cases, courts have relied on the information contained
in the foreign judgment when making an independent probable
cause determination that there was a reasonable basis to find that the
fugitive committed the offense upon which the extradition request
was based. For example, in Arambasic v. Ashcrof,9 ° the probable cause
ruling was based on the information contained in the foreign court's
124-page "Sentence and Judgment" order. 9' In a similar vein, in
Haxhiaj v. Hackman,92 the Fourth Circuit ruled that the certified copy
of the opinion by the Court of Appeal of Milan "clearly afford[ed] a
' The court
reasonable basis upon which to find probable cause."93
observed that the "opinion [was] remarkable for its detailed description
of the evidence developed during the investigation" of the fugitive's
drug trafficking operations, including his role. 94
Lastly, illustrative of a scenario where, in addition to the foreign
conviction, other record evidence was presented in support of the
extradition request is the case of In re Extradition of Neto.5 There,
France sought Jos6 Germano Neto's extradition for violations of its
9
narcotics laws relating to the unlawful exportation of cocaine.
While the defendant was convicted in absentia of those charges, the
evidence adduced by the government at the hearing, which included
wiretap records, hearsay testimony of co-conspirators, police reports,
and photographs, established probable cause to believe that defendant was guilty of the charges for which he was sought.97
Id. at *8, 10.
403 F. Supp. 2d 951 (D.S.D. 2005).
91 Id. at 953; see also Germany v. United
States, No. 06 CV 01201, 2007 WL
2581894, at *6, 8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2007).
92 528 F.3d 282 (4th
Cir. 2008).
93 Id. at 289.
89
90

94

Id.

95

No. 98 CR.MISC.1THK, 1999 WL 627426, at *4-6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 1999).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *4-6; see In re Extradition of Harusha, No. 07-x-51072, 2008 WL
1701428,

96

97

at *6 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 9, 2008) ("The evidence ...submitted in support of extradition consist[ed] of the affidavits of Albanian prosecutors summarizing the testimony
of eyewitnesses, as corroborated by other evidence."); In re Extradition of Haxhiaj,
No. 1:05mj829, 2006 WL 2381966, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 16, 2006) ("The supplemental
record, a statement by [the] Italian Magistrate ... now summarizes the evidence itself. The prisoner's guilt of drug trafficking was proven by a combination of wiretaps
of his conversations and physical surveillance of his activities."); In re Extradition of
Yarden, No. 87-1250-M, 1989 WL 56119, at *1-2, 8 (E.D.N.Y. May 24, 1989) (discussing information from police reports); In re Extradition of D'Amico, 177 F. Supp. 648,
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E. Due Process, Extraditability, and Surrender
An in absentia conviction is not grounds to find that a fugitive is
not extraditable because he may not be afforded a new trial upon
surrender to the requesting state. In Gallinav. Fraser,' the defendant
was found extraditable to Italy on the basis of two in absentia convictions for robbery." In one of the cases, he was represented by counsel. 0 0 In rejecting the defendant's contention that a finding of extraditability violated his due process because he would be returned
directly to prison without a trial, the United States Court of Appeals
for Second Circuit noted that it could find "no case authorizing a
federal court, in a habeas corpus proceeding challenging extradition
from the United States to a foreign nation, to inquire into the procedures which await the [defendant] upon extradition...0 ' The court
further observed that the case law holding that in absentia conviction
should be treated as a charge "[was] not to be construed as a statement that [a] federal court may, as a condition of discharging the
writ, require retrial in the foreign country."1 0 2 Rather, what that holding stood for was simply that an in absentia conviction does not preclude a district court from making an independent, probable-cause
determination as to whether the evidence presented justifies a reasonable belief that the fugitive committed the crime for which extradition is sought.'0 3 Ultimately, as recognized by the Second Circuit,
the conditions governing the surrender of the fugitive "remain in the
651 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (evidence at hearing included written statement from victims of
crime as well as statements of defendant's associates); cf United States v. FernandezMorris, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1365 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (affidavit of complainant and
summary of proceedings before judge, including the judge's findings and sentencing
of defendants insufficient to establish probable cause); United States v. Jacobs, 176 F.
Supp. 877, 879-83 (N.D. Ohio 1959) (affidavits and transcripts of depositions insufficient to establish probable cause).
177 F. Supp. 856 (D. Conn. 1959).
Id. at 862.
100 Id.
101 Gallina

v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 78 (2d Cir. 1960). In the course of its ruling, the
court suggested in dicta that it could "imagine situations where the relator, upon extradition, would be subject to procedures or punishment so antipathetic to a federal
court's sense of decency as to require reexamination of" the non-inquiry principle.
Id. at 79. Subsequent opinions from the Second Circuit have raised questions about
the legal force of this dicta. See, e.g., Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 174-75 (2d Cir.
1980); Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 484-85 (2d Cir. 1976). Furthermore, as
noted by the court in Hoxha v. Levi, this highly questionable "exception remains
theoretical, however, because no federal court court has applied it to grant habeas
relief in an extradition case." Hoxha v. Levi, 465 F.3d 554, 564 n.14 (3d Cir. 2006); see
alsoAhmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063, 1066 (2d Cir. 1990).
102
Gallina,278 F.2d at 78-79.
103 Id. at 79.
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hands of the State Department."1' 4 Following the teaching of Gallina,
courts consistently have applied the principle that while "the fact that
an extraditee was not present for his trial and sentencing is a factor
properly considered by the Secretary of State in deciding whether to
grant extradition, it is not a defense to a request for extradition, nor
is it a basis for dismissing an extradition request."' 0 5
V.

CONCLUSION

As demonstrated by the discussion above, some courts treat in
absentia convictions in the same manner as a conviction in which the
defendant was present, reasoning that, on their face, both types of
0 6°
convictions establish probable cause for purposes of extradition.
When the defendant has participated at his trial but then voluntarily
excused himself prior to the conclusion of the proceedings, courts
have found that an ensuing conviction rendered in absentia is sufficient to establish probable cause to extradite the fugitive. 0 7 Representation by counsel at the trial in some cases will not be enough to
give an in absentia conviction conclusive effect for purposes of probable cause. 108 In those cases, as well as cases where the defendant was
not present at trial, many courts will treat the in absentia conviction
as a charge, requiring an independent determination of probable
Id.
In re Extradition of Harrison, No. 03 CR. MISC. 01, 2004 WL 1145831, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2004); see United States v. Bogue, No. CRIM.A. 98-572-M, 1998 WL
966070, at * 2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 1998) ("A determination of the French government's procedural fairness in undertaking the [defendant's] trial in his absence ...
is beyond the scope of this [c]ourt's review. 18 U.S.C. § 3186. These are questions
which are better left to the Secretary of State, who can adequately determine whether
humanitarian issues preclude extradition."); In re Extradition of Yarden, No. 87-1250M, 1989 WL 56119, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. May 24, 1989) ("[T]he clear weight of authority
in [the Second] Circuit requires this court to refrain from inquiring into the Belgian
procedures awaiting [defendant] should he be extradicted [sic]."). See generally M.
104

105

CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE §

7.2, at 572-73 (4th ed. 2002) ("Nothing... prevents the executive branch from considering policies and practices in the requesting state that may be deemed too fundamentally unfair and contrary to United States public policy, thereby permitting
exercising executive discretion and refusal to surrender the person otherwise judicially found extraditable.") (footnotes omitted).
See United States v. Avdic, No. CR. 07-M06, 2007 WL 1875778, at *8 (D.S.D.
June 28, 2007); Lindstrom v. Gilkey, No. 98 C 5191, 1999 WL 342320, at *10 (N.D.
I11.
May 24, 1999); Bogue, 1998 WL 966070, at *2; DeSena Gouveia v. Vokes, 800 F.
Sup0? 241, 245 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
See United States ex rel. Bloomfield v. Gengler, 507 F.2d 925, 928-29 (2d Cir.
1974); Lindstrom, 1999 WL 342320, at *10.
10 See Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1960); In re Extradition of Ernst,
No. 97 CRIM.MISC.1 PG 22, 1998 WL 395267, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y.July 14, 1998).
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cause that, based on the evidence presented, the fugitive committed
the offense(s) for which extradition is sought.' °9 In practice, this has
resulted in some courts declining to find probable cause in support
of extradition when the government has relied on little more than
the in absentia conviction itself in support of its extradition request,"0 while in other cases, the foreign judgment appears to have
provided sufficient information for the courts to make an independent determination of probable cause."' And, in another category of
cases, additional records have been provided which the courts have
relied upon to arrive at their probable cause rulings. 112 Lastly, while
an in absentia conviction will be "considered by the Secretary of State
in deciding whether to grant extradition, it is not a defense to a request for
extradition, nor is it a basis for dismissing an extradition re113
quest."

109 SeeArgento v. Horn, 241 F.2d 258,
264 n.1 (6th Cir. 1957); In reExtradition of
Haxhiaj, No. 1:05mj829, 2006 WL 2381966, at *1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 16, 2006); Arambasic
v. Ashcroft, 403 F. Supp. 2d 951, 962 (D.S.D. 2005); In re Harrison,2004 WL 1145831,
at *1 n.1; In re Extradition of Ribaudo, No. 00 CRIM.MISC.1PG.(KN, 2004 WL
213021, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2004); In reErnst, 1998 WL 395267, at *7; In reExtradition of Mylonas, 187 F. Supp. 716, 721 (N.D. Ala. 1960); United States ex rel. Argento v. Jacobs, 176 F. Supp. 877, 879 (N.D. Ohio 1959); Ex parte La Mantia, 206 F. 330,
331 (S.D.N.Y. 1913); ExparteFudera,162 F. 591, 592 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908). See also In
re Yarden, 1989 WL 56119, at *7-8.
110See In re Ribaudo, 2004 WL 213021, at *6-7; In re Ernst, 1998 WL 395267, at *8,

10.

111 See Germany v. United States, No. 06 CV 01201, 2007 WL 2581894, at *6, 8
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2007); Arambasic, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 953.
112 See In re Haxhiaj, 2006 WL 2381966, at *2; In re Extradition of
Neto, No. 98
CR.MISC.1THK, 1999 WL 627426, at *4-6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 1999); In re Yarden,
1989 WL 56119, at *1-2, 8; In re Extradition of D'Amico, 177 F. Supp. 648, 651
(S.D.N.Y. 1959); cf. United States v. Fernandez-Morris, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1366-69
(S.D. Fla. 1999);Jacobs,176 F. Supp. at 879-83.
113 In re Harrison, 2004 WL 1145831, at *8; see Gallina, 278 F.2d at 78-79; United
States v. Bogue, No. CRIM.A. 98-572-M, 1998 WL 966070, at * 2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13,
1998); In re Yarden, 1989 WL 56119, at *6-7.
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